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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order for the testimony of Defendant's step-sons
Eric

and

Erron

Speer

to be admitted

as

impeachment

by

contradiction evidence, it must be established that the Defendant
offered evidence of his character as an essential element of a
defense.

Testimony cited by Respondent in its reply brief

placing the Defendant's character at issue is more correctly
qualified as background information, the sequence of events as
they transpired on the day in question, and the Defendant's
opinion about why his sons distrusted him.

At no time was the

Defendant's character made an issue of a defense, or an essential
element of the crimes charged.

As a result, the testimony of

Eric and Erron Speer constituted an impermissible attack upon the
Defendant's character and
The

should have been excluded.

failure of the Trial Court to enter an order

reassigning the matter to Judge Fredericks denied Defendant his
right to adequate notice and opportunity to be heard regarding
the bias and prejudice of the newly assigned Judge.

As a direct

result, the Defendant's Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice was
untimely and then subsequently withdrawn based upon Defendant's
understanding
challenge

that the Affidavit

was tardy.

The right to

the bias and prejudice of a Judge is considered

substantial enough to merit a ruling of prejudicial error.

The evidentiary record fails to clearly establish the
Defendant's intent in carrying a firearm during the incident in
question.

Rather, the record unequivocally states that at no

time did the Defendant threaten his wife with the gun or use it
in his confrontations with her.

Consequently, a reasonable basis

exists for aquitting the Defendant of the aggravated charges and
convicting him of the simple charges of assault and burglary.
Defense counsel's failure to request a lesser included
offense instruction for burglary and assault, as well as his
failure to notify and to consult with the Defendant regarding the
stipulated continuance on a collateral criminal charges caused
the Defendant to suffer the admission of highly prejudicial
testimony without adequate opportunity to prepare a defense. The
likelihood

of a different

result constituted

sufficient

prejudicial error to merit reversal and remanding herein.
Finally, while Defendant concedes that the Prosecutor
correctly

stated

the

law with

regard

to the

elements

for

aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, Defendant reasserts
the impropriety and prejudicial effect of the cross-examination
questions on collateral matters unrelated and immaterial to the
immediate alleged criminal act.

Likewise, Defendant cites the

improper argument of the Prosecutor with regard to prior bad acts
of the Defendant.

Each one of the foregoing errors, together and

separately, constitute sufficiently prejudicial error to merit
reversal and remanding of this matter.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TESTIMONY OF ERIC AND ERRON SPEER WAS
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Under

the general

rule f

evidence

of a person's

character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion.

Utah Rule of Evidence 40 4(a) (19 86 Supp.)

However, a defendant

may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of

his character, or prosecution may offer evidence to rebutt the
same.

Utah Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1).

Furthermore, evidence of

other crimes or wrongs may be admitted for other purposes such as
proof

of

motive,

opportunity,

intent,

preparation,

knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.
of Evidence 40 4(b).

plan,

Utah Rule

Specific instances of prior conduct are

thus admissible in cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim
or defense.
controversy";

Admissibility hinges on questions of "issues in
character

evidence

is

only

admissible

when

character is at issue, either as an element of the charge, as a
defense, or as a rebuttal to such a defense.
To become

an element

of a defense, the issue of

character must be raised by the defendant in his case.

In the

immediate proceeding, Respondent avers that the Defendant placed
his character in issue by attempting to paint himself as a loving

husband and father who would never hurt his wife and children,
(Brief

of Respondent

at 15.)

Based

upon

this assertion,

Respondent continues to structure its argument for admissibility
of the testimony of Eric and Erron Speer as rebuttal testimony to
the character evidence proffered by the accused on direct and
cross examination testimony.
following

excerpts

Specifically, Respondent

cites the

from the Defendant's testimony:

Direct

examination - that Defendant's wife turned their two sons against
him (Record at 509), Defendant was allowed in victim's home on a
number of occasions after being granted permission
507, 5 1 1 ) , Defendant

restrained

victim

(Record at

from hitting and

scratching him (Record at 513), Defendant had no intentions of
harming victim, rather his intention was to kill himself, and he
restrained Mrs, Speer a second time from leaving the house
(Record at 514); on cross examination - Defendant loved the
victim, would not hurt her, and had not abused her over the
proceeding ten years (Record at 516, 537, 538), Defendant did not
tie the victim's wrists and did not remember how they both ended
up on the floor (Record at 541), he had not threatened or harmed
the boys in the past, and he loved them (Record at 549).
The major

flaw in Respondent's argument is that the

testimony cited above was not offered to prove an element of the
Defendant's character as a defense to the charges, nor was it
offered

to prove an element of the charges of burglary,

aggravated burglary, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, assault,
or aggravated assault.

Rather, the Defendant's testimony on

direct was admitted for the purpose

of determining his opinion

of why his sons mistrusted him and the testimony elicited from
the Defendant on cross examination which admitted under Utah Rule
of Evidence 608 (b) to attack his credibility.
proffering

of the two boys1

Furthermore, the

testimony on rebuttal was not

directed toward establishing the Plaintifffs intent, but was
offered specifically as evidence of the Defendant's character and
his criminal propensities.
As stated more fully in Appellant's Original Brief, the
subject testimony of the two boys was inadmissible under Utah
Rule of Evidence 608(b), an express limitation on extrinsic
evidence attacking or supporting a witness1 credibility.

The

standard as applied in this state is commonly known as the
"linchpin test".
Respondent

State v.- Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah

has conceded

that such testimony

is arguably

inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 608(b).
Respondent at 10-11.

1977).

Brief of

However, the State offers the alternative

argument of admissibility of the testimony under Utah Rules of
Evidence 40 4 and 40 5, claiming the Defendant's character was at
issue.
It is firmly and universally established in policy and
tradition that the prosecution may not initiate an attack on the
Defendant's

character.

Wigmore" on" Evidence, Section

57

(1983

Ed.)

Only after a Defendant has attempted to show his good

character in his own aidf can prosecution offer rebuttal evidence
of bad character.

Id. at Section 57. The question becomes then,

did the Defendant place his character at issue in the trial
proceedings?

Where a Defendant calls a character witnessf who

testifies as to specific character traits that would support a
defense, rebuttal evidence as to bad character or to impeachment
of the good character evidence is clearly admissible.

Where the

Defendant testifies himself as to his personal background and
history and the testimony tends to show that the Defendant is the
sort of exemplary person who is not likely to commit the crimes
charged, the courts tend to rule on the question of admissibility
differently.

A witness who testifies

to such

identifying

biographical data as place of birth, education, address, marital
status, length of residence in the community and employment
history has been held to not constitute placement of character at
issue.

State-• v. Bright, 543 P.2d 928 (Kan. 1975).

Where

the

Defendant's testimony goes beyond the background parameters and
attempts to characterize the Defendant or the Defendant's past
life as blemish free, or makes reference to specific prior
incidents, the Defendant then foregoes the protections of the rule
of character evidence,

id. at 930.

The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the following
interchange between defense counsel and the witness constituted
character evidence:
"Q. Well, state what his disposition is as
far as being - well whatever you think of, I
don't want to lead you, of course."
M

A. George is a nice fellow, he is an easygoing fellow.
He loves to drink and be
around people, violent- George is not the
violent type."
Based upon this interchange, the appellate Court affirmed the
admission of cross examination testimony

regarding a prior

conviction of the Defendant for armed robbery.

The direct

testimony in the immediate case is distinguishable from the
Byigfrt case.

On direct, the testimony

of the Defendant

regarding the status of his marriage, the length of the marriage,
his employment

history, and

his terms of residence in the

community were merely background information to introduce him as
a witness to the jury.

Neither the testimony

regarding

Mrs. Speer's turning the two boys against the Defendant nor the
testimony as to the sequence of events on the day of the incident
charged tended to establish any character trait of the Defendant.
In no way did any of the direct testimony attempt to characterize
Defendant or go beyond the limitations as outlined by the Kansas
Supreme

Court

in State v. Bright.

Rather, this

testimony

at

most went toward the Defendant's opinion about why his sons

distrusted him and the actual physical sequence

of events as

they transpired.
With

regard

to the

testimony

elicited

on

cross

examination, it is generally held that the Defendant as a witness
is indeed subject to the issues of credibility
challenged on cross examination.

and can be

However, a general denial by a

Defendant-witness that he did a particular act is not sufficient
to

place the Defendant's character at issue.

209 NW.2d 907, 911

(Minn. 1973).

State v. -Sharich,

In the Sharich case, the

Minnesota Court held that the Defendant witness1 denial of being
a prostitute did not put her character at issue.
barred

The State was

from proffering testimony to rebutt the Defendant's

response or from asserting that such evidence merely went to the
Defendant's credibility.

See also State v. Frentz 354 SO.2d 1007

(La. 1978) (direct denial on cross examination does not put
character at issue).
The common rational for this exclusionary rule can be
reduced to three positions:

(1)

the overstrong tendency to

believe the accused guilty of the charge merely because he is a
likely person to do such acts; (2)

the tendency to condemn not

because the accused is believed guilty of the present charge but
because he has escaped unpunished from other offenses; (3)

the

injustice of attacking one necessarily unprepared to demonstrate
that the attacking evidence is fabricated

(unfair surprise).

Wigmore- - on* Evidence,

Section

58,2.

See

also

Appellantfs

Original Brief, Point I.
While

the

Respondent

argues

that

the

Defendant's

testimony on direct and cross examination placed his character in
issue by attempting to create the image of a loving husband and
father, the Record on Appeal fails to substantiate this position.
Rather, Defendant's testimony

beyond the background

and

introductory statements were merely probative of the actual
physical

sequence

of events

as they transpired

and

Defendant's opinion about why his sons mistrusted him.
character

evidence

submitted

by the Plaintiff

the
The

through the

testimony of Eric and Erron Speer thus constituted an initial
attack upon the Defendant's character rather than the rebutting
of character as an issue.

Under the terms of Utah Rules of

Evidence 404(a)(1) the testimony of Eric and Erron Speer is
inadmissible for failure to qualify as rebuttal as to proffered
character evidence.

Furthermore, the testimony of the two boys

fails to qualify for the purposes of establishing proof of
motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity or absence of mistake or accident.
POINT II
THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO ENTER AN ORDER REASSIGNING
THE JUDGE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR
The Record on Appeal shows no entry of an Order by the
Court reassigning the matter to Judge Fredericks, as required by

Rule of Practice in the District Courts 3.4.

Rather, the

Records shows a minute entry by the Honorable Timothy R. Hansen
dated April 17, 1985 (Record on Appeal at 33) , and a Record of
Proceedings for the trial conducted one week later on April 23
and 24, 1985.

(Record on Appeal at 36-41.)

The Record also

shows that the first objection to the hearing of the matter by
Judge Fredericks came in an Affidavit of Prejudice filed by the
Defendant as counsel pro se on June 15, 1985.
at 198.)

(Record on Appeal

Such Affidavit was subsequently withdrawn on June 1,

1985 by the Defendant with the concurrence with his temporary
counsel Nancy Bergeson
Association.

(Record

of the Salt Lake Legal

on Appeal

at

212.)

Defenders

Ms. Bergeson's

subsequent withdrawal on September 30, 1985 and present counselfs
Entry of Appearance on October

4, 1985 was followed by the

raising of this issue for the second time in the Defendants
present appeal.
Admittedly, the Defendants Affidavit of Bias was filed
after

the conclusion

withdrawn.

of the trial, and was

subsequently

However, the exigent circumstances surrounding the

Defendants legal representation and the reassignment of the case
at the "midnight hour" without benefit of a Court Order justify
the Utah Supreme Court's consideration of this matter on appeal*
By virtue of the Trial Court f s failure to enter an
order reassigning the case from Judge Hansen1 s court to Judge

Fredericks1 Court/ the Defendant was without adequate notice that
such a change was to take placef and that he would have an
opportunity to file an Affidavit of Prejudice against the newly
assigned

Judge.

Rather, the

Defendant's

reassignment came at the trial itself.

first

consider filing an Affidavit of Prejudice.
Defendant's

trial

counsel

of

Without proper notice,

Defendant had no opportunity to review the

the

notice

matter and even

As the case unfolded,

withdrew

immediately

after

sentencing, and Defendant was left to his own devices to contest
the error.
Prejudice

Accordingly, Defendant
as counsel pro se.

filed

his Affidavit

As a Defendant

of

representing

himself, and without adequate knowledge of the laws of Utah, the
timeliness of Defendant's Affidavit is

reasonable.

In light of

these exceptional circumstances, it is proper for this Court to
consider the issue in its present posture.
Utah

Code

Section 77-35-12(d),

Ann. (1953 as amended), State v.- Steqqell,

660

P.2d

252, 254 (Utah 1983).
Rule

30

of the

Utah

Rules

of Criminal

Procedure

provides in part that any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not effect the substantial rights
disregarded.
amended).

of a party shall be

Section 77-35-30(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as

This Court has interpreted the Rule to require the

reversal of a conviction only when the error "is something
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is reasonable
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different

result."

State

\r. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635,

636

(Utah

1982)

cited

State

v.

316

(Utah

1983)

in

Tucker,

(citations omitted).
court

to

provide

709

P.2d

313,

In the immediate case, the failure of the
Defendant

with adequate

notice

of the

reassignment of judge constituted prejudicial error; with proper
notice, Defendant would have had a reasonable opportunity to
prepare and file his Affidavit of Prejudice with the assistance
of legal counsel and the question of Judge Frederick's bias or
prejudice could have been resolved in a timely fashion.
the Affidavit in its rough form may not upon its

While

face establish

a reasonable likelihood that Judge Fredericks would have been
found to be biased or prejudiced against the Defendant, the fact
that Defendant prepared the document without benefit of legal
counsel, and subsequently withdrew it upon the advice that its
tardiness made it an improper motion before the Court effectively
denied Defendant

his due process guarantees of a fair and

unbiased

tribunal.

See

Riley v. State, 608

P.2d

27

1980).

In Riley, the Alaska Supreme Court held

(Alaska
that the

underlying court abused its discretion in failing to waive the
strict time limits

imposed

upon a criminal defendant

requesting a change of Judge.

in

The Court based its conclusion

upon the clear fact that petitioners did not have an opportunity
to consult counsel before the time to exercise such right had
expired, and could not have intelligently made such decision
19

without counsel.

The right to peremptorily challenge a judge was

held sufficiently

important

that it should not be lost by

inaction before there is an opportunity to confer with an
attorney,

608 P.2d at 29.

See also Adams v. State,

376

NE.2d

482 (Ind. 1978) (pro se defendant's Motion for Change of Judge
erroneously denied where a judgefs identity first learned of
after expiration of time period.)
The Trial Courtfs

failure to comply with Rule of

Practice 3.4 thus denied the Defendant his recognized right to
challenge the bias or prejudice of the judge, and the denial of
such right is sufficient to merit a ruling of prejudicial error
herein.
POINT III
THE RECORD SUPPORTS DEFENDANT'S ACQUITTAL ON AGGRAVATED
CHARGES AND CONVICTION ON SIMPLE CHARGES
The basis of the Statefs assertion that Defendant
should be convicted on aggravated charges of burglary and assault
rests upon the Defendant's "brandishing" of a firearm during the
incident. (Brief of Respondent at 25.)
clearly establish the presence of the
intended to threaten the victim.

Yet, the record does not
firearm was in any manner

Rather, the Record on Appeal

merely establishes the presence of the firearm, and the ambiguity
of its purpose.
Sharon Speer testified that the Defendant was carrying
a shotgun when he first entered her bedroom (Record at 408), and

that he laid it on the floor (Record at 417) .

After an ensuing

struggle, Defendant helped Ms. Speer up from the floor, took the
shotgun and walked with her back downstairs (Record at 418). The
parties engaged in a second struggle in which the Defendant used
both of his hands in squeezing Ms. Speerfs throat (Record at 42022).

In order to use both hands, he would have had to lay down

the rifle.

Defendant then took a cabinet in an adjacent room,

the original shotgun and went with his wife back up to the
bedroom (Record at 423). At that time, Defendant held on to both
of the guns with one hand and made Mrs. Speer walk ahead of him
up the stairs

(Record at 423-24).

The parties again went

downstairs to the kitchen and back up to the bedroom (Record at
42 4)

after having laid the second gun on the bedroom floor where

it remained (Record at 425).

Although Defendant told Ms. Speer

that the gun was loaded (Record at 425) , when they returned to
the kitchen one more time, Defendant placed the gun on the floor
beside him (Record at 431).

After the Defendant fixed both of

them some coffee, he took the shotgun and the coffee and they
again returned to the bedroom

(Record at 428) .

As they drank

their coffee, the Defendant placed the gun on the floor beside
him

(Record at 431).

Upon hearing the doorbell

ring, the

Defendant and Mrs. Speer went downstairs to the kitchen, leaving
the rifle upstairs in the bedroom (Record at 435), where it was
later found by the arresting officer (Record at 475).

Mi

During this entire time, the Defendant never pointed
the gun either at Ms. Speer or himself (Record at 450). Norf did
he ever say he was going to kill the Defendant (Record at 450) .
Yet he did tell the Defendant that "life wasn't worth living; I
had hurt him so badlyf did so many wrong things to him and he
just didn't want to live.11

(Record at

449.)

Mrs. Speer

interpreted this to mean that the Defendant was going to kill
himself.

Id.

Each of the times that the Defendant struggled

with his wife, the gun was not used nor pointed at Mrs. Speer in
a threatening manner.

Rather, the Defendant pushed her (Record

at 414), and used his hands in squeezing her throat (Record at
421).
Clearly, the use of the firearm in the assault is
placed in question.

When evidence is ambiguous and therefore

susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one alternative
would permit acquittal of the greater offense and conviction of
the lesser, a jury questions exists and the court must give a
lesser included offense instruction at the
Defendant.
situation

request of the

-State- v. Baker, 671 P. 2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983).
has

arisen

where

the critical question

This

is the

determination of what inferences may legitimately be made on the
basis of the evidence.
By assessing
the evidence and deciding whether
any interpretation of it would, if believed by the
jury, permit conviction of the lesser offense and
acquittal of the greater, the Court "preserves the
reviewing of evidence for the jury but is still able

to protect the weighing process from frivolous 'red
hearings1", id.
As in the case of State-v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551

(Utah

1984) looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Defendant there was evidence presented that showed Defendant did
not threaten

Mrs. Speer

with

the gun, either

verbally or

physically, nor did he use it in any of his struggles with her.
Rather, in each instance where the parties were confrontive,
Mr. Speer laid the gun aside and used his bare hands.

The record

does not show any evidence that the Defendant ever placed his
hands upon the gun's trigger, nor make any other motions in an
attempt to use the gun.
the

Defendant

did

not

Contrary to the respondent's assertion,
"brandish

the gun while

assaulting

Mrs. Speer" (Respondent's Brief at 26). Likewise, the Defendant
did not use the gun in gaining entry into Mrs. Speer's home.
evidentiary record

The

fails to establish that Defendant used a

deadly weapon in the alleged assault, or threatened the immediate
use of the same as required under Section 76-5-103(b) or Section
76-6-203(b)-(c),

Utah

Code

Ann.

(1978).

Consequently, a

reasonable basis in the evidentiary record exists for acquitting
the Defendant of the aggravated charges and convicting him of the
simple charges of assault and burglary.
Respondent claims that because the Defendant failed to
offer such lesser included offense in its jury instructions that
he is precluded from raising the issue on appeal.

However, as

stated in the Appellant's initial appeal brief at 17, and Section
77-35-19(c), Utah Code Ann,

(1953), notwithstanding

a party's

failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order
to avoid manifest
raise an

injustice.

The failure of defense counsel to

objection to the omission of such jury instruction

assigned as error by Appellant

is

(Appellant's Brief at 11-12), and

Appellant's substantive and procedural rights should not suffer
because

of his counsel's

error.

To hold

otherwise would

constitute a manifest injustice.
POINT IV
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ERRORS WERE PREJUDICIAL
As detailed more fully in Point III of this Reply
Brief, Defendant suffered prejudicial error as a result of the
lack of a lesser include offense instruction for simple assault
and

burglary.

As stated

establishes sufficient

therein, the Record

on Appeal

evidence to acquit Defendant

on the

charges of aggravated assault and burglary and to convict him of
the charges of simple assault and burglary, under the standards
of review set forth by this Court under State v.- Baker, 671

p.2d

at 159.
Likewise, Defendant

suffered prejudicial

error

as a

result of his counsel's unauthorized stipulation to a continuance
of a second criminal case against the Defendant,

The Record on

Appeal establishes that the evidence regarding a prior bad act
17

became the focus of a heated debate between trial counsel and the
prosecutor (Record on Appeal at 523-53 4),

At the conclusion of

the debate, the trial court allowed the admission of evidence
regarding a prior incident in December, 1984, the subject of the
collateral criminal charge.

The basis for the Court's ruling

was that the testimony was relevant as to whether or not the
Defendant logically thought he was welcome in Mrs. Speer's home
(Record on Appeal at 529).

(Record on Appeal at 530-53 4).

Mr.

Speer was then subjected to a rigorous cross-examination by the
prosecution

concerning a completely separate incident.

The

Defendant was without prior notice of such attack and was not
prepared to defend himself, nor was he allowed to consult with
his attorney in order to prepare an adequate response to such
impeachment

testimony.

This

error

combined

with

defense

counselfs failure to prepare evidence and offer the testimony of
credibility witnesses to bolster the Defendant's testimony in
response to the rigorous cross-examination denied Defendant his
right to effective

assistance

of counsel and materially

prejudiced his defense.
Had the second criminal matter against the Defendant
been argued as originally scheduled, Defendant would have had the
opportunity

to prepare

and

collateral criminal charges.

present

a full

defense

to the

He would have had the opportunity

to consult with counsel regarding his testimony per the alleged
offense.

He would have had adequate opportunity to depose

w i t n e s s e s such as Jeanie H e s s l i n g f
,(

Eric S p e e r , Sharon Speer and

.

matter

developed,

examinatior • r

tu

Defendan

..

a,;:,, f lie

cross-

concerning

•

j

-

;. .^ntu:

prosecutor with q u e s t i o n s

bad act deemed admissi. .-

f

\-n-

a prior
or;« : >u <>f'

.

establishing whether or not Defendant w a s w e l c o m e in his wife's
home.
The Trial Court in its discretion -.; owoc; ~;;c admission
o"

th-*'-- e v i d e n c e ,

strenuous -

c ••»-r t be

--«;.'•

c o n t i n u a n c e . • : : -- s e c o n d

Defendant ^ --nowledao

counsel
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"onsent
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criminal matto:
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the matter
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continued
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aaaii L-t
that

r;ofendant

placed

defense

-. •;;, c - . n : . d, Had

by s t i p u l a t e

> i opportunity

I: : : tl le

defendant

would

to rebutt t h e c h a r g e s

and t h e incident w o u l d have been held a crime or dismissed as not
criminal.

Questions
have

Subsequent inquirv and admissibility in ihe immediate

going

then

But

and Defendant

•

pii^t

t he

been properly

restricted.
case,

behind

convi. i i i *. • o- , , c c .

limited and t h e p r e j u d i c i a l

-

cu a t

evidence

ma 11 e r wa s i i iq i 1 i i: e c:l :i i 11 c :i i 1 t 1 1 € • i mmed i a t e
was not provided

•J
7 7-1 6

would

/-is uraranteed
r.--..i .:• nefense.

*.;. w *

I -• :

- '

rights to
Section

. - o c 11 o n

1 2 , II t a h

Constitution.

Defendant

thus suffered

the admission of

inadequately contested allegations of prior bad acts and the
prejudicial effect of such evidence upon his

character - the

picture created was of a violent man prone to commit the charges
alleged, and the jury was accordingly influenced.

Without such

evidence, a different verdict would likely have resulted in
either guilty of the simple charges or acquitted.
While defense counsel is allowed a certain amount of
discretion in his "legitimate exercise of judgment as to trial
tactics or strategy", State" v. McNicole, 554 P.2d 203, 205

(Utah

1976), such discretion does not empower the attorney to "impair
the

client's substantial rights".

696 P.2d 645, 6 50
herein

breached

Blanton~ v.

(Cal. 1985).

the

parameters

Womencare,

Inc>

Defense, counsel's actions
of permissible,

individual

discretions, fell below the objective standards of reasonably
competent, professional assistance, State v% Frame, 723 P.2d
(Utah 1986), and substantially prejudiced appellant's
Such ineffective assistance of counsel necessarily
reversible

error.

State v. McNicole, 554 P.2D

410

defense.

constitutes

203,

204

(Utah

1976).
POINT" V
THE PROSECUTOR'S CHARACTER QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT CONSTITUTED
IMPROPER CONDUCT
As stated more fully in Point I, the admissibility of
character evidence of a Defendant is limited to elements of a

charged

o f f e n s e , offers

,, ..t

by t h e Defendant;,

.

r rebuttal to t h e

vi.if -e 40 4(a) (1) (19 S3

amended).

Yet
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immediate alleged

criminal
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sufficient prejudicial error for reversal by this Court,
State v, Hodges, 5] 7 P.2d 1322 (Utah 197 4); State v. Dickson,

01

>- 1

See
12

Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412; State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266f 383 P.2d
407, cited in Appellantfs Brief at page 18.
Appellant

concedes that the closing argument

of the

prosecutor contained a correct statement of law regarding the
elements

for

aggravated

However,

Appellant

burglary

does

cite

as

and

aggravated

improper

assault.

argument

the

prosecutor's discussion of the prior bad acts of the Defendant
(Record

on Appeal

at 310-311).

Over

defense

counsel's

objections, Mr, Horton specifically argued that these prior bad
acts

establish

offenses.

a character

which

conforms

to the

charged

Where such issues are inadmissible as evidence (See

Points I and IV above) they are likewise inadmissible in argument
by counsel and constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant requests that this
Court reverse the Trial Court f s conviction of Defendant, and
remand for appropriate proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3/*rday

of December, 1986.

JEROME H. MOONEY
/J1
u
R. KYLE TREADWAY
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

DBSPEEP

(4)

UTAH CONSTITUTION

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in. which the ofTense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same ofTense.

RULE OF PRACTICE DISTRICT COURT

RULE 3.4. CONTINUANCE OF CRIMINAL CASES AND CRIMINAL MOTIONS
(a) All motions for continuance of trial or hearing shall
be made orally in open court or in writing, and shall state the
reasons therefore together with proof that notice of the motion
has been duly served upon the adverse party.
Notice of all
continuances must be given to the defendant.
Notice of a
continuance may be given in person f by telephone or by inal 1
The
manner i 11 which notice was effected shall be set. forth i i 1 the
file.
(b) Criminal cases that have been set for trial or hearing
shall not be continued or reassigned except, upon order of the
Court.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.— (1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in section 76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another,* or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a irluh) of the third degree.

76-6-203. Aggravated burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary, the
actor or another participant in the crime i
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in
the crime; or
(b) Uses or threatens the imnjediate use of a daugerous or deadly
weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) Is armed with a deadly weapon or possesses or attempts to use
any explosive or deadly weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a felony of the first degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-203, enacted by
L. 197S, ch. 196, § 76-6-203.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant. (1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a CODV of the accusation filed against him:
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses
:
n his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor
a husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by
a magistrate.

77-35-12. Rule 12 — Motions.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or
to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set
by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown
may grant relief from such waiver.

77-35-19. Rule 19 - Instructions.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.

77-35-30. Rule 30 — Errors and defects, (a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance uhich does not affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court
may order.

UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE

RULE 404
CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is not admissible fur the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 60S, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

RULE 405
METHODS OF PROVING CHARACTER
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of
character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation
or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquin- is allowable
into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also
be made of specific instances of his conduct.

RULE 608
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may,
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness,
be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination when examined with
respect to matters which relate only to credibility.

